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	3 October 1961 U-2 file
MEMORANDUM FOR:	Director of Central Intelligence
VIA:	Deputy Director (Plans)  Acting Chief, Developments Projects Division
SUBJECT:	Approval for U-2 Coverage of North Vietnam (with permission to "stray" into South China)
REFERENCE:	Minutes of Special Group Meeting 28 September 1961 (COR-1362)

- 1. This memorandum contains a recommendation for approval in paragraph 8.
  - 2. The Special Group on 28 September decided as follows:

"The Group finally agreed that another U-2 flight should be mounted over North Vietnam to supplement the information received in August, and that this flight could be authorized to "stray" across the border so as to obtain oblique photography of key airfields in China near the border."


Reconnaissance before the Special Group on this occasion relates to this subject was the recommendation for coverage of China mainland with special and immediate emphasis being given to certain targets on Hainan Island and those relatively near the South China border which are of importance in judging the military buildup in the Indochina situation (see attached copy,

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- 6. In the light of the Special Group's approval, it would appear that the major objective is North Vietnam and the coverage of requirements in South China incidentally. As a matter of fact, the most pressing requirements of the community are to cover those targets remaining in Hainan (2), not covered in the targets immediately north of South China border which relate to the Communist Chinese military support capability and in Laos. The attached map shows the priority requirements in North Vietnamand Laos, and North Vietnam. These targets are critical for appraising Communist activities in
  - a. Resumption of operations in Laos and
  - b. Support of new Communist attacks on South Vietnam.

Within these targets as outlined those point and area targets in Laos are highest priority; those in North Vietnam south of Vinh second priority; and those in North Vietnam from Hanoi to Vinh are third in importance. It is not as critical to cover the rail lines from Hanoi northeast and northwest to the South China border, although such coverage if it could be obtained would be significant in terms of Communist China resupply problems, and therefore, desirable.

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	7. To sùm úp	:		
			Special Group approval for one m "straying" into South China.	
		of importa	d requirements in Southeast inceSouth China and Hainan North Vietnam.	
	c. It i ments to have at l		y in order to meet these require- -2 missions.	
be au <del>map.</del>	thorized to make the	he flighte w	is recommended that U-2 missions which are outlined on the attached equil to accomplish to of the attached knay.	eh_
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<b>.</b>		Con	amittee on Overhead Reconnaissance	
	hment:			
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<del>-</del>	y Director lans)	Date	The recommendation contained in paragraph 8 is approved:	
			Director of Central Intelligence	
Acting	g Chief, DPD-DDP	P Date	Date	
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